In this paper, we investigate the discrepancy between a serial version and a parallel version of zero-knowledge protocols, and clarify t h e information "leaked" in the parallel version, which is not zero-knowledge unlike the case of the serial version. We consider two sides: one negative and the other positive in the parallel version of zero-knowledge protocols, especially of the Fiat-Sharnir scheme.
Introduction and motivation
T h e notions of interactive proofs and zero knowledge were introduced by Goldwasser, M i d i and Rackoff [GMR] . Fiat and Shamir [FiS] exhibited a practical identification scheme, which is zero-knowledge, based on the intractability of the factorization.
A common weakness in such zero-knowledge protocols is that the protocols require many iterations of a basic (three move) protocol, then such zero-knowledge protocols are not efficient.
The straightforward parallelization of the basic protocol decreases the round complexity of the protocols. However, a problem on the straightforward parallelization of zero-knowledge protocols is that a technique of the proof of zero-knowledge in the serial version, so called resettable simulation, fails in the parallel version.
Feige, Fiat and Shamir [FSS] showed that the parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir identification scheme releases no "useful" knowledge that could help the verifier to impersonate the prover within the identification system.
On the other hand, Goldreich and Krawczyk [GKr] observed that non zero-knowledgeness is an intrinsic property of the three move protocols, and showed that the parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir scheme is not zero-knowledge unless the factorization is tractable.
Our motivation of this study is derived from these contradictive results on the security of the parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir scheme (generally, the three move protocols). Some researchers characterize the security of the p a r d e l execution of the Fiat-Shamir type identification scheme [FSS, FeS, OhOk'88, BM] . However, none has investigated what kind of information is leaked by the parallel version or how useful these knowledge is for the verifier.
In this paper, we investigate the essential discrepancy between the serial version and the parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir scheme (more generally, zero-knowledge protocols), and clarify properties which the parallel version has b u t the serial version does not have.
Our main observation is that the information "leaked" in the parallel version of the FiatShamir identification scheme is closely related to a digital signature which is a modification of the Fiat-Shamir identification scheme, and the parallel version of zero-knowledge protocols leave a trace.
Furthermore, we consider two sides of the discrepancy, one negative and the other positive.
O r g a n i z a t i o n of this p a p e r In section 2, we give the definitions and overview the Fiat-Shamir scheme. In section 3, we consider the reason why straightforward parallelization fail to be zero-knowledge. In section 4, we point out abuses of the parallel version. In section 5, we positively apply the parallel version. Finally, we conclude with future topics.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give some definitions on zero-knowledge [GMR] and overview of the FiatShamir scheme [FiS, FSS] . The reader who is familiar with these topics may skip this section.
Notation and Definitions
Our model of computation is the interactive probabilistic Turing machines (both for the prover P and for the verifier V ) with an auxiliary input. The common input is denoted by z and, and its length is denoted by 12.1 = n. We use v ( n ) to denote any function vanishing faster than the inverse of any polynomial in n. More formally, We define negligible probability to be the probability behaving as v ( n ) , and overwhelming probability to be the probability behaving as 1 -v ( n ) .
Let A ( z ) denote the output of a probabilistic algorithm A on input 2. This is a random variable. When we want to make the coin tosses of A explicit, for any p E {O,l}* we write Alp] for the algorithm A with p as its random tape. Let Vp(z) denote V's output after interaction with P on common input z, and let M(z; A ) (where A may be either P or V ) denote the output of the algorithm iM on input 2 , where M may use the algorithm A as a (blackbox) subroutine.
Each call M makes to A is counted as a single computation step for M .
Definition 2.1 [GMR] : interactive probabilistic Turing machines (P, V) satis[ying:
An interactive proof for membership of the language I, is a pair of M e m b e r s h i p C o m p l e t e n e s s : with overwhelming probability. Formally:
where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of P and V .
M e m b e r s h i p S o u n d n e s s : in any way, V accepts P"s proof with negiigible probability. Formally:
If z does not belong to L and P-mav act where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of P' and V .
It should be noted that P's resource is computationdly unbounded, while V's resource is bounded by probabilistic polynomial time in :xi.
Definition 2.2:
checking whether ( 2 ,~) E R is computed in probabilistic polynomial time.
is the set o f w such that ( z ,~) E R. Definition 2.3 [FSS] :
interactive probabilistic Turing machines (PI V ) satisfying:
Let R be a relation { ( z ,~) } testable in 8 P P . Namely, given x and w , For any I, its An interactive proof of knowledge for the relation I? is a pair of Knowledge Completeness: with overwhelming probability. Formally:
where the probability is taken over dl of the possible coin tosses of P and V . Knowledge Soundness: to accept onlyifhe actually "knows" a witness for z E dom R. An expected polynomial time knowledge extractor .bf is used in order t o demonstrate P"s ability to compute a witness. Formally:
For any z, for any P', P" can convince
where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of : \ f and 1;. P' is assumed not to toss coins, sincehis favorable coin tosses can be incorporated into the auxiliary input w ' . The knowledge extractor >\I is d o w e d to use P-as a blackbox subroutine and runs in expected polynomial time. Each message that P' sends M costs a single computation step for M.
Note that both P's and V ' s resource are bounded by probabilistic polynomial time in I z / We recall that the view of the verifier is everything he sees during an interaction with the prover, that is, his own coin tosses and the conversation between himself and the prover.
Definition 2.4 [GMR]:
of V' on input z is the probability space Let ( P , V ) be an interactive protocol and let z E {O,l}*. The view
where p is 8 polynomial bounding the running time of V', and ( P w V ' [ R ] ) ( z ) denotes the probability space of conversations between P and b"[RJ on input z (the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of P ) .
Denote by Tirne,v'(z) the running time of machine V' when interacting with P on input 2.
Definition 2.5 [GO] : An interactive proof system ( P , V ) ofknowledge for the relation R is blackboz simulation perfect zero knowledge if there exists a universal simulator Su which runs in expected polynomial time, such that for every polynomial Q and any pair ( I , y, V') such that (z,y) E R and Tirne&)(z) 5 Q (~E ' ) ? SU(z; l,'-'(z)) is exactly identical to VIE\,t '(p(v) ,vt)(z).
Formally:
Blackbox simulation zero knowledge represents the strongest notion of zero knowledge among the types of the simulation (cg. auxiliary input oero-knowledge [GO] ) although all known concrete zero knowledge protocols are in fact blackbox simulation ~e r o knowledge. Thus these defidiono above ate reasonable and never too ratrictive.
Throughout tbir papa, we use a term "zero knowledge" in the aenac of blackboz aimdataon tero knowledge.
2 (reap. B) represent6 the real prover (resp. verifier) who follows its designated protocol.
A reprerents a polynomial time cheater who doer not possess the witnerr (or secret) but can derive from the protocol in an ubitrsry way. reprerents an arbitrary polynomial time verifier who tries to extract dditianal information from 2.
Definition 2.6 [FSS]:
The protocol (A,B) d e r s e s no transferable information ifi 1. It succeed8 witb overwbelming probability.
2.
There is no codition of 6, fi with tbe property that, dier a pdynomidy many number of executions of (x,B) it is possible to execute (A,B) with a non negligible probability 
The Fiat-Shamir scheme
Fiat and Shamir [FiS] exhibited a p r s c t i d identification scheme and a signature scheme that are provably secure if factoring is difficult. We overview their scheme.
Fiat-Shamir identification mehama (FSIS)

PRBPBOCESSING STAGB BETWEEN THC TRUSTED CENTER AND EACE USER
The unique trusted cmter'r secret key in the system in (PI a), and the public key ir N , where p , q me distinct large primes, N = p x q. The center generatea wer A'i m t key 6~, where l / a~ = 6 (mod N). IA is the identity of user A and i u published to other UUI.
bENTI?lGATION STAGE BtTWEEN USER A AND USER B
Repeat itep (a) to (d) t timei. The user B accepts A's proof of identity only if all t round checks are succet~sfnl.
Remark 3.7:
In the parallel version of the protocol above, A rends B all the c; ( i = I,. . . , t ) simultaneously, then B sutdr A all the e; ( i = 1,. . . , t ) , and finally A rmds all the y; (i= 1 , . . . , t ) to B.
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Furthermore, Fiat and Shamir modified the identification scheme above into a non-interactive digitd signature scheme by replacing the verifier B's role by the prover with a pseudo-random function f .
Fiat-Shemir digital signature scheme (FSDS)
PREPROCESSING STAGE BETWEEN THE TRUSTED CENTER A N D EACH USER
Same as the preprocessing stage in FSIS.
T O SIGN A MESSAGE hf!
The user A picks ri ER 2, (i = 1,. . . , t ) , and calculates z i 3 v z (mod N ) (i = 1,. . .,t), f(M, z1,. . . , zt) and sets its first t bits to ei (i = 1,. . . , f ) . Furthermore, the user A computes , . . . , t ) to the user B.
g. , = -j e i p ; (mod N ) ( i = 1,. . . , t ) and sends M , e i , y , (i = 1
T O VERIFY A'S SIGNATURE ON &f :
The user E calculates z; = yfl:; 
2.3
Feige, Fiat and Shamir [FSS] showed that FSIS is provably secure. Namely, Proposition 2.8 [FSS] :
proof of knowledge.
Although Feige, Fiat and Shamir IFSS] did not show that the parallel version of FSIS is zero knowledge, they did show that the parallel version of FSIS releases no "useful" knowledge that could help the verifier to impersonate the prover within the identification system. Namely, Proposition 2.9 [FSS] :
ferable in for m a tion.
Note that Proposition 2.9 does not imply that the parallel version of FSlS releases no "useful" knowledge that could help the verifier to cheat oukide the identification system. Goldreich and Krawczyk [GKrj observed that non-zero-knowledgeness is an intrinsic property of the parallel version of the FSlS protocol. [BMO] proposed how to pardlelize FSlS with preserving zero-knowledgeness.
Their scheme is not three move and needs some additional interactions between the prover and the verifier.
In this paper, we use a term "parallel" version of protocols in the sense of the (three move) straightforward paallelhation as in Remark 2.7.
With respect to the security of FSDS, Fiat and Shamir showed Proposition 2.11 (FiS] : able under an adaptive chosen message attack unless factoring is easy. Remark 2.12: A variant of the Fiat-Shamir scheme has proposed ;GQ1] and the security as in Proposition 2.9 has been considered [OhOk'SS]. Brickell and McCurley [BM] proposed a modified Schnorr's identification scheme [Sch! based on a special discrete logarithm problem, and gave a formd proof on the security. Probably secure three move identification scheme based on the general problems is proposed by Okamoto [Okal. Wfien f is a truly random function, FSDS is existentialiy unforge-3 Why does straightforward parallelization fail to be zero-knowledge ?
Feige, Fiat and Shamir's result in Proposition 2.9 guarantees a security of the parallel version of FSIS. O n the other hands, Goldreich and Krawczyk's statement in Proposition 2.10 implies the parallel version of FSlS is not (blackbox simulation) zero knowledge. Many researchers [FSS, BC] remarked that the parallel version of FSIS could leak some "partial" information on the prover's secret.
Our first question is :
Question A: What information is released in the parallel version of FSIS ?
To prove a protocol to be zero knowledge, a main technique is to reset a (cheating) verifier, so called resettable simulation [GMR] . Many researchers [BC, BMO] 
Abuses of the parallel version
In this section we point out abuses of the parallel Fiat-Shamir scheme based on our remarks in the previous section.
Non-transferable information helps to forge secure digital signatures
We consider a practical system which consists of FSIS and FSDS.
Suppose a prover uses only one secret key 3 for his public information I, in the system. Namely, the prover shows his identity via the serial version of FS15 using the secret s, and the prover signs messages via FSDS using the same secret 3. This system is convenient for the prover because he keeps only one secIet information.
However, if the prover shows his identity via the parallel FSIS, not via the serial one, this system is not secure for the prover. As we noted in the previous section, in the parallel version of FSlS a cheating verifier can get the prover's digital signature of FSOS for any message M while the verifier interacts with the prover in FSIS. In this system, FSDS(or FSIS) is not secure.
Note that "releasing no-transferable information" by Feige, Fiat, and Shamir (FSS] guarantees the security of the case only when the prover's secret information is used in the identification systems.
Remark 4.1:
We may prevent the verifier's cheating above by using a different security parameter t in the signature stage and in the identification stage. However, such temporary protection never implies the provable security of the system.
Message authentication based on the public key
The message authentication is used as a data integrity mechanism to detect whether data have been altered in an unauthorized manner. An implementation of message authentication based on the conventional secret key cipher (e.g. DES) is Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
[ISO]. The public-key based message aufhentication is defined as:
Validity:
the validity of a message to any user B by using .4's public key.
In the authentication stage, only the user A can prove
The authentication stage based on the public key needs an interaction between the prover and the verifier, while MACs is non-interacfiueiy verified by the only receiver who knows the same secret key as the sender has. Note that the digital signature [DH] is verified by anybody wztkout interaction using only the signer's public key.
Desmedt [Des] and Guillou-Quisquater :GQ2] applied FSIS to the public-key based message authentication. Guillou and Quisquater modified the (extended) Fiat-Shamir identification scheme into a message authentication by using a one-way hash function. The one-way hash function is used to mix the message into the communication for the identification.
Guillou-Quisquater's Message Authentication based on the (extended) Fiat-Shamir scheme
PREPROCESSING STAGE B E T W E E N THE TRUSTED C E N T E R A N D E A C H USER
In t h s system, the center's secret key is p , 4 (distinct large primes) and the public key is N = PQ and L . 
AUTHENTICATION STAGE BETWEEN THE USER A A N D T H E USER B (a)
The user A sends his message M with h s identify I,., to the user B . sends z and u t o the user B .
quits the procedure.
The user B recognizes that ,kf is A's valid message only if ail t round checks are successful.
T h e serial version of the protocol above (when t = O( "1) and L = O(1) 1 is zero-knowledge, and the security of parallel versions, which a r t not zero-knowledge, is studied by Ohta and Okamoto [OhOk'88] . However, no discrepancy between the serial and the parallel of the message authentication based on the (extended) Fiat-Shamir scheme has known. We clarify the discrepancy.
Desmedt [DesJ considered the one-time-validity of the message authentication and Okamoto and Ohta [OkOh'90] called the same notion non-trensitiwe signature:
Validity: M to any user B by .4's public key.
N o n -t r a n s i t i v i t y :
origin of the message '2.I to another user C Only the user A can prove the validity of a message
The user E cannot transfer the proof of A's
We should notice that the ordinary (transitive) digital signature [DH] does not satisfy the condition of non-transitivity. i.e, in the digital signature any user B can transfer the proof of A's origin of the message M to another user C and the user C can check the correctness of the proof of A's origin of the message M using only A ' s public key.
Okamoto and Ohta implemented message authentication based on the modification of the prover's randomness in the (extended) Fiat-Shamir scheme.
Desmedt [Des] mentioned that the serial version of his message authenticatim is nontransitive (one-time-valid), however nothing was mentioned in the case of the parallel version. Note that the serial version of Guillou-Quisquater's message authentication is non-transitive. Okamoto-Ohta [OkOh'90] claimed, without formal discussion, that both the serial and the parallel version of t h e message authentication are non-transitive. But, our claim is as follows. After receiving prover's message A 4 , r I , . . , , z t and u = g(M,z1,. . .,q) and the verifier sends back di(i = 1:. . . , t ) which is computed as ( & , . . . , t i t ) = h(zl,. . . ! z t ) by a one-way hash function h. After receiving the prover's answer y,(z = 1 , . . . , t ) for d,(i = 1,. . . , t ) , the verifier records H = (Af, I], . . . , q , h , d,, . . . , d t , y l , . . . , y t ) as the history of the communication with prover A . Once the verifier publishes the history W , anyone can check the validity and the origin of message M by calculating u = g ( M , y l L I $ (mod N ) , . . I , y t L I $ (mod N ) ) , a n d ( 4 , . The same kind of abuse as above cannot be applied to the scheme based on the serial
Positive applications of the parallel version
In this section, we consider positive applications of the parallel version.
Okarnoto and Ohta jOkOh'891 proposed a blind signature scheme, which was introduced by Chaum [Ch'82] , based on a combination of the parallel version of FSlS and FSDS. This is the first positive application of the parallel version of Fiat-Shamir scheme although Okamoto and Ohta did not clarify the distinction between the parallel version and the serid one of the Fiat-Shamir scheme. The technique used in Okamoto-Ohta scheme is more sophisticated than one observed in subsection 4.1, however Okamoto and Ohta's technique is applied to a special class of problems which satisfy a condition, so called r a n d o m 8elf reducibility [TW] , and seems not to b e applied to the parallel version of more general zero-knowledge protocols (e.g. the
references [GMW, BCC]).
We consider positive applications of the parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir scheme, which can be applied to the parallel version of the more general protocols.
The parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir scheme leaves a trace
Our observations in the previous sections suggest that the parallel version of FSIS leaves some trace, unlike the case of the serial version of zero-knowledge FSIS. We positively apply the trace t o message authentication with the proof of the origin and to a protection of divertibility of interactive protocols.
Testifiable message authentication
As we pointed out in the previous section, the message authentication based on the parallel FSlS does not satisfy the non-transitivity. We positively apply the transitive trace of authentication stage i n the parallel version of FSiS.
I n the message authentication based on the serial FSIS, the sender (signer) can deny the fact that the signer has shown authentication, because there are no evidence of the prover's proving stage. Okamoto and Ohta [OkOh'90] remarked this property as a merit to show the distinction between non-transitive signatures and Chaum's undeniable signature [CAI. Occasionally, however, we needs an evidence to avoid prover's denying the fact of his authentication on the message. The trace in the parallel version is useful for the evidence.
Suppose that user A sends a message M to user B . A testijiable message-authentication has the following properties.
Validity:
In the authentication stage, only the user A can prove the validity of a message M to any user E by A's public key.
Testifiability: Any user C can check the fact that the user A has given t h e proof of A's origin on the message M by 4's public-key without interaction with A.
It must be noted that the digital signatures [DH] satisfy the condition ,of testifiability, however, t h e digital signatures do not have the authentication stage where A can prove to B that he is A .
We propose a message-authentication which is a modification of the verifier's randomness in the parallel version of the message authentication using the Guillou and Quisquater's idea. P r o p o s e d testifiable message authentication
PREPROCESSING STAGE BETWEEN T H E TRUSTED CENTER A N D EACH USER
Same as the preprocessing stage in FSIS. Furthermore, two one-way hash function g and h are published to all users.
AUTHENTICATION STAGE BETWEEN T H E USER A A N D T H E U S E R B (a)
The user A sends his identity IA and a message M A to user B (b) The user A picks ri ER 2; ( i = 1,. . ., t ) , and computes z; 2 r? (mod N ) (i = 1 , . . . , t ) , and u = g(hfA,x1,. . . , z t ) . The user A sends 2 1 , . . . , z t and u to the user B . (c) The user B selects a message RB at random, calculates h ( R g , zl,. , . , 2,) . The user B sets its f i s t t bits to e; ( i = 1,. . . , t ) and sends ei (i = 1,. , , , f) and Rg to the user A . . . , zt) are e; (i = 1,. . . , t ) . If the check is not valid, the user A quits the procedure. Otherwise, the user A sends to E yi E s'ir; (mod N ) (i = 1,. . . , t ) .
(e) The user B checks that z i = g ( M A , z l r . .
. , z t ) and 2; 5 y : I ; ; (mod N ) (i = 1,. . . , t ) . If the check is not valid, the user B quits the procedure.
After all procedures are passed, the user B accepts that MA is A's valid message.
PUBLICATION A N D V E R I F I C A T I O N O F T H E E V I D E N C E O F THE AUTHENTICATION
If the prover denies his authentication on the message M A , the verifier shows The authors [SI] applied the proposed testifiable message authentication to a digital credit card system, where both the identification and the digital signature are required.
Protection against divertibility
Desmedt et al. [DGB] pointed out a n abuse of FSIS, so called Mafia fraud p r o b l e m , where an intermediate verifier B can masquerade as the genuine prover A to another (victimized) verifier C while A proves his identity to B, and B cancels any evidence which shows that B is assisted by A. This concept was formulated as divertibility of (zero-knowledge) protocols by Okamoto and Ohta ; OkOh'89] . They proposed some types of measure to protect against such an abuse.
We propose a simple technique t o protect against t h e abuse of divertibility of the parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir scheme, which cannot be applied to the serial one. Figure 1 describes the technical details on the divertibility of the parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir scheme. The divertibility is arisen from the property that there are no evidence which distinguishes two communication data, ((21,. . . , z t ) , (G,. . . , G ) , (~1 , . . . , y t ) ) and ((21,. . . ,&), ( e l , . . . , e t ) > & I , . . . , i t ) ) .
Proposed countermeasure
The technique used in our proposed testifiable message authentication is useful to create an evidence which distinguishes the data. Consider the following modified protocol:
After receiving t h e prover's first message (zl,. . . , z t ) , the verifier selects a random message Rv. computes h ( R v , z l , . . . , z t ) and sets its first t bits t o e l , . . . , e,. T h e n t h e verifier sends t h e random message Rv t o t h e prover instead of sending e l , . . . , e,.
T h e prover sends back t h e verifier y; E ~; ( y ; )~< ( i = 1,. . . , t), where ( e l , . . . , e,) = h ( R v , 2 1 , . . . , z t ) as t h e ordinary parallel Fiat-Shamir scheme. In this modified protocol, the way of the verifier's generating the challenge bits ( e l , . . . ~ e t ) is restricted and the verifier's computation in the original divertible protocol (Figure 1 ) cannot be apply to the modified protocol.
The proof on the correctness of our countermeasure is obtained from the same argument as the proof of the security of FSDS (Proposition 2.11). The protection is rather practical than theoretical because it is assumed in a way similar t o Proposition 2.11 that the function h is a (blackbox) truly random function.
Remark 5.1: Ohta, Okamoto, and Fujioka [OOF] proposed how to protect the djvertibility by using a bit commitment function. Their countermeasure is useful for both the serial version and the parallel version. However, our proposed countermeasure is applied to only the parallel version.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we clarify the discrepancy between the serial version and the parallel version of zero-knowledge protocols, especially point out the relation between the "information" leaked in the parallel version of the Fiat-Shamir identification scheme and the Fiat-Shamir digital signature scheme. Furthermore, we consider the merit and demerit of the parallel version with comparing to the serid one. Note that our observation is applied to general zero-knowledge protocols, which is a sequential iteration of a three move protocol.
T h e security of the straightforward parallel execution of the Fiat-Shamir type identification scheme is characterized by some researchers [FSS, OhOk'88, FeS, BM, Oka] . However, their results heavily depend on the structure of the underlying problems (e.g. factorization, or digcrete logarithm), and the technique of the proofs fails in the case of the straightforward parallel execution of the zero-knowledge protocol for general problems like as Graph-3-Colourability [GMW, BCC] . The security of these protocols are still unclear. The security of three move protocols [FSS, OhOk'88, FeS, BM, Oka] , which are based on some a l g e b r~c problems, guarantees only the case within the identification system, and nothing ia mentioned outside the identification system. T h e security of an identification and a signature is one of the central topics in modern cryptography, and many results are known. However, the aspect of these researches on the security is irrelevant t o each other. We must study the security of the combination of the different objects.
